The Sarbanes-Oxley Act as Confirmation of Recent Trends in Director and Officer Fiduciary Obligations by Fairfax, Lisa M.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 76 
Number 4 Volume 76, Fall 2002, Number 4 Article 12 
February 2012 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act as Confirmation of Recent Trends in 
Director and Officer Fiduciary Obligations 
Lisa M. Fairfax 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Fairfax, Lisa M. (2002) "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act as Confirmation of Recent Trends in Director and Officer 
Fiduciary Obligations," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 76 : No. 4 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol76/iss4/12 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AS
CONFIRMATION OF RECENT TRENDS IN
DIRECTOR AND OFFICER FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATIONS
LISA M. FAIRFAXt
INTRODUCTION
It is axiomatic that corporate directors and officers owe a
fiduciary duty of care to the corporations that they manage.1
While courts and other bodies have reshaped the parameters of
that duty throughout the years, at its core, the duty is designed
to ensure that top managers govern in good faith and in the best
interests of the corporation. 2 Many have responded to the
recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the "Sarbanes Act"
or the "Act")3 as if it dramatically alters the responsibilities of
corporate managers. This Article argues, however, that the
Sarbanes Act confirms at least some case law-even in
Delaware-and other recent articulations of management's
fiduciary duty.
At a minimum, recent allegations regarding corporate
misconduct may suggest some degree of confusion on the part of
corporate officers and directors about the manner in which
corporate managers comply with their fiduciary duty. Indeed,
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; A.B.,
Harvard College, 1992; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1995. This Article benefited from
conversations with participants in the Symposium: Enron and Its Aftermath, St.
John's University School of Law, Jamaica, New York (Sept. 20, 2002). Specifically, I
would like to thank Leonard M. Baynes and Cheryl L. Wade for their comments
regarding fiduciary duty and the importance of In re Caremark International Inc.,
698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), to discussions regarding the evolution of that duty.
1 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d
125, 130 (Del. 1963).
2 By statute, the standard of conduct for directors and officers requires that
they act in good faith and in a manner they reasonably believe to be in the best
interests of the corporation. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30(a), 8.42(a) (1999).
3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
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congressional inquiries related to director and officer behavior
reflect a relatively low standard of conduct on the part of such
managers and suggest that some corporate officers believe this
conduct to be consistent with their corporate duties. 4 While this
belief may be consistent with some case law on the subject,
other, often more recent, trends reflect an alternative view. 5
Recent pronouncements by courts, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and even the United States Sentencing
Commission (the "Sentencing Commission") appear to require
more exacting standards of conduct from directors and officers. 6
Thus, far from charting a new course, the Sarbanes Act
represents a natural extension of these pronouncements-
affirmatively embracing the enhanced standard called for by
these bodies. In this way, the Sarbanes Act may be viewed as a
welcome confirmation of more stringent requirements for
corporate managers.
By way of background, this Article begins by identifying the
principle components of corporate fiduciary law and then uses
congressional testimony to demonstrate the manner in which
some directors and officers appeared to comply with those
components. Part I of this Article ends by explaining case law
that appears to support the relatively lax standard of conduct
revealed by congressional testimony. Part II reveals how the
Sarbanes Act imposes various fiduciary-type obligations on
directors and officers that demand standards at odds with those
highlighted in Part I. Drawing on the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (the "Guidelines"), as well as on case law and SEC
releases, Part II underscores the parallels between the
obligations in the Sarbanes Act and those imposed by recent
articulations of corporate fiduciary law. Part II also reveals that
much of the behavior of some corporate officers and directors
highlighted in congressional testimony would fail to pass muster
under such articulations. The Article concludes with an
assessment of the Sarbanes Act's ability to ensure that directors
and officers will comply with the more stringent fiduciary
obligations it imposes.
4 See infra Part I.B.
5 See infra Part I.B.
6 See infra Part II.B.
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I. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND CORPORATE MISCONDUCT
A. Some ABCs of Corporate Fiduciary Duty Identified
Corporate law, buttressed by securities law, imposes upon
directors and officers a fiduciary duty of care, which often
manifests itself in the form of a monitoring function. For
directors, a duty to monitor corporate affairs stems from the
principle that all corporate affairs must be managed under the
direction of the board of directors. 7 Courts and commentators
interpret this monitoring duty to mean that directors have an
oversight function.8 Executive officers have a similar oversight
role. Such officers often delegate responsibilities to lower level
employees.9  Like directors, officers also must monitor the
actions of employees to whom they delegate responsibility. 0
This monitoring function involves several different, and
often overlapping, duties." One principle duty requires
corporate officers and directors to remain informed about the
affairs of the corporation.' 2 As one court noted, the duty to
manage corporate affairs means that directors and officers are
under a "continuing obligation to keep informed about the
activities of the corporation."1 3 Another duty, which is a natural
by-product of the duty to remain informed, is the duty to ask
questions of the corporate agents to whom top-level managers
have delegated various corporate functions.' 4 Indeed, while
7 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised
by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation
managed under the direction of, its board of directors .... ").
8 See id. § 8.30(b) (stating that directors must devote attention to their
oversight function); Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891) (finding that
directors have a duty to supervise and manage corporate affairs); Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (discussing the duty of directors to
actively supervise and manage corporate affairs).
9 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42(b)(1) (noting that officer is entitled to rely
on employees of the corporation).
10 See id. § 8.42 cmt. at 8-79-8-80.
11 See id. § 8.30(a) cmt. at 8-40 (noting that directors' conduct entails several
duties including the duty to become informed, the duty of inquiry, the duty of
informed judgment, and the duty of attention).
12 See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining duty to remain informed).
13 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981); see also
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("[D]irectors have a duty to inform
themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information
reasonably available to them.").
14 See infra Part II.B.2 (describing duty of inquiry).
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these managers may rely on other agents to keep them informed,
under certain circumstances, they have a duty to second-guess
those agents and make independent inquiries into corporate
affairs. 15  Directors and officers who discharge their
responsibilities in compliance with these obligations avoid
liability to shareholders and the corporation. 16
B. Fiduciary Obligations As Reflected in Corporate Misconduct
The recent allegations regarding corporate misconduct
provide important insights about the manner in which directors
and officers believe they must demonstrate compliance with
their fiduciary obligations. 17 Although this behavior may not
represent a universal pattern, congressional testimony and
investigations surrounding this misconduct indicate how some
managers performed their duties. Indeed, the directors and
15 See infra Part II.B.2 (describing duty of inquiry).
16 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42(c) (stating that an officer is not held liable
if she performs duties in compliance with Sections 8.42(a) and 8.42(b)); see also id. §
8.42 cmt. at 8-80 (noting that statute makes clear that performance meeting the
section's requirement will eliminate officer's exposure to liability).
17 This Article's purpose is not to restate the lengthy accounts of such
allegations. For an in-depth review of the conduct related to Enron Corporation, see
Peter Behr & April Witt, Visionary's Dream Led to Risky Business; Opaque Deals,
Accounting Sleight of Hand Built an Energy Giant and Ensured its Demise, WASH.
POST, July 28, 2002, at Al (first of five part series detailing the various financial
transactions leading to Enron's rise and ultimate collapse); April Witt & Peter Behr,
Dream Job Turns Into a Nightmare, WASH. POST, July 29, 2002, at Al (second in
five part series detailing events in August 2001 related to the fall of Enron's stock
price and its growing debt burden); Peter Behr & April Witt, Concerns Grow Amid
Conflicts; Officials Seek to Limit Probe, Fallout of Deals, WASH. POST, July 30, 2002,
at Al (third of five part series detailing Enron's activities in September 2001 related
to preliminary internal investigation into Enron accounting problems); April Witt &
Peter Behr, Losses, Conflicts Threaten Survival, WASH. POST, July 31, 2002, at Al
(fourth of five part series detailing events in October related to Enron's declaration
of $1 billion in losses); Peter Behr & April Witt, Hidden Debts, Deals Scuttle Last
Chance, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2002, at Al (last of five part series detailing Enron's
disclosure of additional losses and final declaration of bankruptcy). For information
related to other corporate misconduct, see generally, Frank Ahrens, AOL Discloses
Revenue Errors: $49 Million From Ad Deals Misbooked, Firm Tells SEC, WASH.
POST, Aug. 15, 2002, at Al; Kathleen Day, XEROX Restates 5 Years of Revenue; '97-
'01 Figures Were Off By $6.4 Billion, WASH. POST, June 29, 2002, at Al; David S.
Hilzenrath, Former Rite Aid Officials Indicted; US. Says Executives Inflated
Profits, Diverted Funds, WASH. POST, June 22, 2002, at Al; Carrie Johnson &
Christopher Stern, Adelphia Founder, Sons Charged; Family Looted Sixth-Largest
Cable TV Company, U.S. Says, WASH. POST, July 25, 2002, at Al; Kevin Maney,
Latest Charges Leave WorldCom in Limbo: Company, Former CEO Ebbers Could be
Next on Fed's List, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2002 (Magazine), at lB.
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officers who appeared before Congress seemed to recognize that
they were under an'obligation to monitor the affairs of the
corporation and that this function included some duty to be
informed and to ask relevant questions.'8 Their testimony and
other reports suggest, however, that they felt comfortable with
meeting this obligation in a less than vigilant fashion.
These directors appeared to satisfy their duty to remain
informed primarily through reliance on other officers and agents,
coupled with a relatively cursory review of specific transactions.
In fact, several directors testified regarding the difficulty of
overseeing the companies on whose boards they served because
of the part-time nature of their jobs and the magnitude of the
enterprises they were charged with governing. 19 A majority of
the directors had other demanding jobs or obligations to occupy
their time.20 As a consequence, a report of the congressionally
appointed special investigation committee, chaired by William C.
Powers, Jr. (the "Powers Report"), 21 reveals that these directors
may have made decisions without sufficient information
regarding company transactions or their companies' financial
situation.22  Other testimony confirms the Powers Report. 23
Admittedly, congressional probes revealed that certain officers
withheld vital information from the board and top corporate
18 See, e.g., The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron's Collapse: Hearing
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Robert K. Jaedicke, former
Chairman, Audit and Compliance Committee, Board of Directors, Enron
Corporation) (discussing duties and responsibilities of board and its committees); id.
(statement of Herbert S. Winokur, Jr., Member, Finance Committee, Board of
Directors, Enron Corporation) (discussing Board's responsibilities).
19 See id. (statement of Winokur) (noting directors' limited role within large
corporations and the part-time nature of their job).
20 See id. Twelve of the fourteen board members were outside directors. The
Chairman of the Audit Committee also served at Stanford Business School during
his tenure. See id. (statement of Jaedicke).
21 See Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Comm. of the Bd. of
Dirs. of Enron Corp. (Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Powers Report], available at
http://news.findlaw.con3/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf.
22 See id. at 151 (noting Board's failure to consider issues necessary to ensure
the viability of conflict of interest transaction involving LJM1 and Andrew Fastow,
Enron's chief financial officer).
23 See Jackie Spinner & David S. Hilzenrath, Enron CEO Felt "Betrayed," Panel
Told; Head of Internal Probe Testifies on the Hill, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2002, at Al
(noting that Former Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay claimed that he should have
paid more attention to company documents, and that he did not appreciate the
nature of the financial information within company documents).
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executives. 24 Further probing also revealed that even when such
officials had access to information, often they only briefly
considered complex, and potentially risky, transactions.25
Instead of an in-depth review, these corporate officials regularly
relied on other managers and agents to monitor and ensure the
accuracy of company information, or the validity of specific
transactions. 26 This was true even when officials had access to
information that should have raised suspicions about the
reliability or integrity of various information or transactions.27
In this respect, directors suggested that their duty to remain
informed depended almost completely on reliance on other
agents and limited review of complex transactions.
Congressional testimony and related investigations also
suggested a less than rigorous standard for the duty of inquiry.
Directors' admissions that they had a limited awareness of the
financial information contained in documents that they signed
reveals their failure to make any significant inquiries regarding
those documents. 28 In this respect, some appeared to ignore the
duty of inquiry altogether.29 Other corporate officials appeared
to believe that the existence of internal control procedures
obviated the need for extensive inquiry. Hence, when asked
about their failure to question information contained within a
document or officers who prepared them, such officials expressed
their belief that control procedures served as a guarantee of such
information. 30 Again, managers held this belief even though
they recognized that the control procedures may not have
mitigated the risk of improper activity.31 Still other corporate
24 The Powers Report notes several instances where corporate officers withheld
information about critical transactions. See Powers Report, supra note 21, at 151
n.68, 156 n.72, 159-61.
25 See id. at 162-65 (pointing out limited board scrutiny of transactions
between Enron and IJM partnerships, which were controlled by its CFO, and
limited review of Andrew Fastow's compensation from such partnerships); id. at 168
(noting limited review by managers of various risky transactions).
26 See id. at 153.
27 See id. at 157-58.
28 See id. at 148-49.
29 See id. at 149 (noting that many board members did not make the inquiries
necessary under the Enron Code of Conduct to permit approval of conflict of interest
transactions between Enron and its CFO); id. at 157 (citing lack of detailed
questions related to the hedging activity of Raptor I).
30 See id. at 154-56 (explaining reliance on controls).
31 See id. at 156 (explaining board members awareness of the severe risk
associated with conflict of interest transactions at issue).
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officers and directors appeared to perform their inquiry duty, but
only in a very perfunctory manner. Such managers insisted that
they questioned others about misleading or contradictory
information of which they were aware.3 2  Reports reveal,
however, that their questions were general in nature, eliciting
general responses. Consistent with this assessment, the Powers
Report concluded that corporate managers failed to closely and
critically question transactions, even when they were aware of
red flags. 33 In this way, most officers and directors appeared to
recognize their obligation to make relevant inquiry, but their
conduct suggests a belief that compliance with this obligation
could be met with less than vigilant attention.
Congressional reports and testimony suggest a lack of
sufficient oversight by executives and directors alike, highlighted
by cursory reviews of, and lack of detailed inquiries into,
important corporate transactions. After his investigation,
William Powers emphasized that the fraudulent transactions he
uncovered "could and should have been avoided" if executives
and board members had taken their fiduciary obligations more
seriously.34 Instead, his report revealed a "fundamental default
of leadership and management."35 This default appeared to stem
from the relatively casual manner with which some such officials
approached performance of their fiduciary responsibility.
C. Seeds of Support for Lax Standards
This manner of compliance may stem from the relatively lax
standard under which courts examine violations of the duty of
care. While acknowledging the duties to remain informed and
ask questions, courts point out that a corporate manager's
liability for breach of those duties is "predicated upon concepts of
32 See The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron's Collapse: Hearing Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Robert K. Jaedicke, former Chairman,
Audit and Compliance Committee, Board of Directors, Enron Corporation) (noting
that board and audit committee raised questions about various conflict of interests
transactions).
33 See Powers Report, supra note 21, at 157-58.
34 See Hearing on Causes, The Role of the Bd. of Dirs. of Enron Impact of Enron
Collapse: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of William C. Powers, Chairman, Special Investigative Committee,
Board of Directors, Enron Corporation).
35 See id.
20021
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gross negligence."36 Courts review director and officer conduct
under the business judgment rule, which operates as a
presumption that their actions are a product of good faith, and
hence should be protected.37 Only when a manager's conduct can
be viewed as a severe departure from reasonable conduct will
courts hold him liable for violating his fiduciary duty of care.
Supporting this concept, there have been at least two major
studies revealing the lack of cases holding corporate directors
and officers liable for a breach of their duty of care.38 One
commentator explained:
The foundation stone of the American law of corporate
governance is currently enunciated in the holdings (not the
dicta) of the leading corporate law states: there must be a
minimum of interference by the courts in internal corporate
affairs. Except in the egregious case of bad judgment or when
there is evidence of bad faith, courts have made no attempt to
second-guess directors on the substantive soundness of
decisions reached. 39
This comment reflects an unwillingness to hold directors
and officers liable for a breach of their duty of care except in the
most extreme circumstances. This unwillingness, in turn,
suggests that the threshold for compliance with fiduciary duties
was relatively low.
II. PARALLELS BETWEEN THE SARBANES ACT AND ALTERNATIVE
ARTICULATIONS OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. Strands of Fiduciary Duty in the Sarbanes Act
The Sarbanes Act appears to impose on corporate directors
and officers many fiduciary-like obligations that alter the low
36 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984) (citing Delaware cases).
37 See id.; Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
38 See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968)
("The search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations have been held
liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for
a very small number of needles in a very large haystack."); see also Henry Ridgely
Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19
DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 981 (1994) (noting that review of Delaware cases involving
breaches of the duty of care "were as disappointing as that earlier encountered by
Bishop").
39 Charles Hansen, The ALl Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due
Care and the Business Judgment Rule, 41 BUS. LAW. 1237, 1239 (1986).
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threshold indicated in Part I. Indeed, the Act can be viewed as
adding content to, and buttressing, the overall monitoring role of
corporate directors and officers. In addition, the Act appears to
ensure that compliance with that role involves more active and
vigilant participation on the part of directors and officers.
1. Duty to Remain Informed
With respect to directors, the Sarbanes Act adds content to
directors' duty to remain informed. In particular, section 301 of
the Act requires the board of directors, through its audit
committee, to appoint and oversee the work of the accounting
firm employed by the corporation.40 In connection with its
oversight, the audit committee is responsible for resolving
disagreements between management and the auditor regarding
financial reporting.41 Members of the audit committee must also
establish a procedure for complaints related to accounting and
auditing matters. 42 They also can engage independent counsel or
advisers to assist them in carrying out their duties.43
In this way, the Sarbanes Act imposes a seemingly
heightened standard for compliance with the duty to remain
informed. The responsibility for resolving auditing disputes
ensures that directors who serve on the audit committee take an
active role in the auditing process. Their review of complaints
also ensures that board members who serve on that committee
remain informed about the company's financial practices and the
manner in which any audit is conducted. Moreover, these
requirements make it difficult for directors to comply with their
duty without gaining knowledge about the process. Hence, mere
reliance on other agents appears insufficient to comply with the
Act's requirements. This certainly suggests a heightened
standard for the duty to remain informed.
The Sarbanes Act also addresses executives' duty to keep
themselves informed regarding company information. The Act
requires executive officers to establish and maintain internal
controls that will ensure that material information is made
40 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745,
776 (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1).
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 See id.
20021
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known to such officers. 44 In addition, both the chief executive
officer and the chief financial officer must certify the
effectiveness of those control procedures. 45  Moreover, the
Sarbanes Act requires that a company's annual report contain
an internal control report that includes management's
assessment of internal control structures. 46 In this way, the
Sarbanes Act requires executives to bear responsibility for the
flow of information within their company. These fiduciary-like
requirements for executives mean that the Sarbanes Act can be
viewed as providing content to the more general duty of
information outlined by corporate statutes and case law.
Then too, these requirements appear to enhance the
fiduciary obligations of such officers. Indeed, because they must
not only ensure that critical information is made known to them,
but also must make a certification to that effect, officers' duty to
remain informed cannot be a passive one. Because they must
provide an assessment of control structures, the Act requires
these officers to be continuously aware of their company's affairs
and any changes to those affairs. While the Act provides for
reliance on low-level employees, it also appears to require
executives to second-guess those employees when they evaluate
the overall effectiveness of the company's control process. Thus,
the Sarbanes Act significantly contrasts with the standards of
care adhered to by the executives of Enron and other
corporations.
2. Duty of Inquiry
While the Act does not specifically impose upon officers or
directors a duty of inquiry, this duty represents an implicit
component of the obligations imposed by the Sarbanes Act.
Indeed, because the audit committee is responsible for ensuring
that complaints about the auditing process are made known to
them, they presumably also must make inquiries about those
complaints to make sure that any report they provide related to
the internal audit remains accurate. Similarly, in order for
44 See id. § 302(a)(4) (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
45 See id. § 302(a)(4)(D) (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
46 See id. § 404 (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7262) (directing the
SEC to prescribe rules requiring that each annual report contain an internal control
report, and that the accounting firm responsible for preparing the report attest to
management's assessment).
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executives to evaluate the effectiveness of any internal controls,
they must ask officers or other agents about questionable
practices that come to their attention. In this way, they cannot
merely rely on the reports of such persons. This suggests a more
probative inquiry than currently exists.
B. Comparison with Recent Formulations of Fiduciary Duties
The reaction to the Sarbanes Act suggests that it imposes
new obligations on directors and officers. Indeed, it appears to
provide a stark contrast to the actions of directors and officers as
revealed by congressional testimony. However, while there is a
wealth of case law reflecting a less than exacting standard for
the duty of care, the Sarbanes Act is closely aligned with more
recent case law and formulations from other entities that make
more stringent demands on corporate officials.
1. Duty to Remain Informed
Some recent case law reveals that at a minimum, the duty to
remain informed encompasses the duty to take an active role in
the company's affairs. In Francis v. United Jersey Bank,47 the
New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether a director could
be held liable for her failure to prevent the misappropriation of
funds by two corporate officials who were both officers and
directors .of the corporation. In that case, Mrs. Pritchard served
as a director of the corporation, along with her two sons.48 The
trial court found that her two sons had siphoned funds from the
corporation under the guise of loans. 49  Both officers had
designated the loans as such on the company's balance sheet, but
the loans far exceeded the officers' salaries as well as the
company's revenue.50 Moreover, the loans were never repaid and
increased annually, leaving the company with insufficient funds
to operate and eventually forcing the company to declare
47 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
48 Id. at 816.
49 Id. at 818. The trial court rejected the characterization of the payments as
loans, and instead found them to be fraudulent conveyances. Id. at 816. The
appellate division agreed that the officers had siphoned assets, but characterized
the misconduct as conversion. Id. at 817. The New Jersey Supreme Court accepted
the conversion characterization, but found that the critical issue was Mrs.
Pritchard's liability. Id.
50 Id. at 819.
2002]
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bankruptcy. 51 Mrs. Prichard was unaware of the actions of the
corporate officers. In fact, she was not active in the business, did
not read its financial statements, and knew virtually nothing
about its corporate affairs. 52 The trial court found that she did
not make "the slightest effort to discharge any of her
responsibilities."5 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed,
explaining that while directorial management does not require a
detailed inspection of daily activities, directors do have a
monitoring role that requires them to remain informed.54 Thus,
directors have to attend meetings regularly and make an effort
to become informed about the company's status.55 Although Mrs.
Pritchard attempted to show that her physical condition had
deteriorated in order to exonerate her conduct, the court
maintained that she had a responsibility to play a role in the
corporation. 56 In fact, the court suggested that the director's
inattention contributed to the corporate misconduct because the
officers knew that she would not serve as a check on their
behavior.5 7  The court held that Mrs. Pritchard's failure to
participate in any of the corporation's affairs violated her
fiduciary duty.
This duty to remain informed also includes the
responsibility to understand business and financial matters
relevant to the company. Indeed, the Francis court pointed out
that a director has a responsibility to maintain familiarity with
the company's financial status. This responsibility includes
reading and understanding the company's financial
statements. 58 In fact, the court noted that a director's lack of
knowledge or expertise with respect to financial matters does not
shield her from liability; instead, a director has an obligation to
gain experience or sufficient assistance to qualify her to perform
her duties.59 If she cannot gain this experience or assistance,
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 820 (quoting Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 392 A.2d 1233 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978)).
54 See id. at 822.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 819-20.
57 See id. at 829.
58 See id. at 825.
69 See id. at 822 (quoting Campbell v. Watson, 50 A. 120 (N.J. 1901)).
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then the director should refuse to act.60 Francis indicates that
acting without adequate financial and business information
related to a given transaction is a violation of the corporate duty
to remain informed.
Similarly, in Smith v. Van Gorkom,61 the Delaware Supreme
Court pronounced that proper exercise of the duty of care turns
on whether directors have informed themselves "of all material
information reasonably available to them prior to making a
decision."62 The court pointed out that fulfillment of that duty
requires more than the absence of fraud or bad faith.63 In Van
Gorkom, the directors were generally familiar with the
company's financial condition. 64 Hence, the directors' level of
awareness related to business and financial matters far exceeded
Mrs. Pritchard's. Despite this awareness, the directors approved
a cash-out merger without the benefit of specific financial and
other material information regarding the merger. 65 The court
concluded that without such information, their decision could not
be viewed as informed. 66 Moreover, because they made an
uninformed decision, they violated their fiduciary duty.67 Van
Gorkom reveals that generalized knowledge is insufficient to
satisfy the duty to remain informed. Rather, managers must
have information, particularly financial information, specific to
the transaction at issue in order to satisfy their duty to make
informed decisions. SEC releases confirm this articulation of
corporate managers' duty to make informed decisions.68
60 See id.
61 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
62 Id. at 872 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
63 See id. (noting that directors had an affirmative duty to protect shareholder
interests by critically analyzing all relevant information).
64 See id. at 868 (explaining that the board received regular detailed reports
about the company's financial condition as well as its future projections).
65 See id. at 874 (noting that directors did not inform themselves regarding the
manner in which the sale price was established or as to the intrinsic value of the
company).
66 See id. at 878 (noting that the board lacked the valuation information
necessary to reach an informed decision about the fairness of the sale price).
67 See id. at 893 (concluding that the directors breached their fiduciary duty by
their "failure to inform themselves of all information reasonably available to them
and relevant to their decision").
68 See, e.g., Report of Investigation in the Matter of National Telephone Co.,
Inc., Relating to Activities of the Outside Directors of National Telephone Co., Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-14380 (Jan. 16, 1978), available at 1978 WL 171339
(noting that even outside directors must maintain a general familiarity with
company documents).
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Moreover, this case law suggests that officers and directors
may not be able to rely on others to keep them informed. In fact,
the directors in Van Gorkom sought to shield themselves from
liability through claims that they relied on both the chief
executive officer and their lawyer's advice.69 Although the court
pointed out that directors are fully protected when they rely in
good faith on reports or other officers,70 the court noted that good
faith does not allow blind reliance. 71 Instead, under certain
circumstances, good faith requires managers to seek out
additional information that would support the information
provided by their CEO and other officers. 72 Similarly, the
directors in Van Gorkom could not blindly rely on their lawyer,
but had to prove that they had a reasonable basis for their
reliance.73 The court found that since they lacked adequate
information to make a decision, their mere reliance on the advice
of counsel was meaningless. 74  Van Gorkom indicates that
corporate officials are not at liberty to completely supplant
reliance for their own knowledge. Hence, reliance, without some
information to support it, does not suffice to comply with the
duty to remain informed.
While they may stand out as the exceptions, both Francis
and Van Gorkom undermine the notion that directors' and
officers' behavior, as illustrated by congressional testimony, was
consistent with their fiduciary duties. Indeed, these cases
suggest that directors cannot use the fact of their limited role or
other outside obligations to excuse their relative lack of
knowledge regarding. corporate transactions. Certainly, if under
Francis, a director's illness does not excuse such behavior, then
concurrent obligations should not. Francis suggests that if
directors do not have sufficient knowledge to make an informed
69 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874-81.
70 See id. at 874-75 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001), enabling the
board to rely upon accounts or reports prepared by corporate agents). The Model
Business Corporation Act contains a similar provision, as well as one that allows
reliance on corporate officers. See MODEL Bus. CORP. AC.T §§ 8.30(c) (officers),
8.30(d) (reports) (1984). A similar provision allows officers to rely on employees or
corporate reports. See id. §§ 8.42(b)(1) (employees), 8.42(b)(2) (reports).
71 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875.
72 See id.
73 See id. at 880-81. The defendants claimed that their lawyer advised them
that they did not need additional information in order to make a decision. See id. at
881.
74 See id.
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decision, then they should refuse to act or resign from their
position.
Further, both Francis and Van Gorkom suggest that when
making any decisions, directors have an affirmative
responsibility to familiarize themselves with the company's
financial health, as well as the specific financial information
underlying a given transaction. This appears to be true
regardless of the complexities involved with such transaction.
Hence, the directors' seeming inability to understand the
intricacies of the financial transaction they approved reflects a
violation of their duty to remain informed. Indeed, these cases
suggest that if directors are uncertain they should refuse to act
and probe more deeply in order to gather the requisite
information.
Finally, the cases suggest that blind reliance on lower level
employees is insufficient to satisfy a manager's duty. Indeed,
congressional testimony reveals that many directors and
executives maintained that they relied on others who claimed to
have knowledge about business matters, without having any
actual knowledge of their own regarding such matters, or the
reliability of the information provided to them. While reliance
may be sufficient in some contexts, the availability of additional
information may have undermined the ability of these managers
to rely completely on others. Indeed, cases reveal that these
managers' duties included gathering such information. Thus,
their efforts at finger pointing may not be sufficient to shield
these managers from their own duty to remain adequately
informed. In this regard, Francis and Van Gorkom cast doubt on
claims that blind reliance by managers satisfied their duty of
care.
The Sarbanes Act appears to reiterate this more exacting
standard of the duty to remain informed. Indeed, the board's
responsibility to oversee public accounting firms under the
Sarbanes Act suggests an affirmative obligation on its part to
keep abreast of financial information. Given that the board
must sign the company's annual report,7 5 the Sarbanes Act's
75 See Amendments to Annual Report Form, Securities Act Release No. 6231,
Exchange Act Release No. 17,114, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 72,301, at 62,812 (Sept. 2, 1980) (amending signature requirement for
annual report to require signature by a majority of the board, the chief executive
officer, the chief financial officer, and the controller).
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requirement to remain informed regarding accounting
information seems consistent with cases that require directors to
obtain appropriate information prior to making decisions.
Similarly, case law suggests that the CEO and CFO's
responsibility to sign company disclosure documents76 requires
that they should be informed prior to approving such documents.
Hence, by imposing an affirmative duty on them to gather
material information related to financial and other data within
public reports, the Sarbanes Act seems consistent with the more
general fiduciary duty to remain informed.
The Sarbanes Act apparently goes further than the
aforementioned cases by requiring managers to take affirmative
responsibility for implementing and maintaining internal
information systems. Old case law negated any affirmative
responsibility for such systems. As early as 1963, the Delaware
Supreme Court determined whether corporate directors had such
a responsibility in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Co.77 In that case, four employees of the corporation pled guilty
to anti-trust violations. 78 Evidence revealed that the directors
had no actual knowledge of the antitrust activity of their
employees. 79 Despite this lack of actual knowledge, shareholders
brought a derivative suit against the directors on the theory that
they failed to take actions to learn about and prevent the illegal
activity.80 In support of this theory, the shareholders pointed to
consent decrees entered against the company in 1937 prohibiting
similar forms of antitrust activity.8l  According to the
shareholders, these decrees put the company on notice of
possible antitrust activity, and consequently triggered an
affirmative duty to actively monitor the company to protect
against such violations. 82 The court pointed out, however, that
none of the current defendants were directors at the time of the
decrees, and that those who were aware of such decrees had
satisfied themselves that the company had not been guilty of
76 See id. at 62, 812-13.
77 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
78 Id. at 128 (noting that the employees pled guilty to a price fixing scheme in
violation of the federal anti-trust laws).
79 Id. at 127.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 129 (identifying decrees that had enjoined various price fixing
agreements).
82 Id.
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engaging in violations.8 3 Hence, mere knowledge of the decrees
did not put them on notice of possible current violations.8 4
Without evidence that the directors knew of facts that should
have put them on notice of possible wrongdoing, the court found
that they did not have an obligation to implement a system of
watchfulness.8 5 Moreover, the court rejected the proposition that
corporate directors have a duty to implement such a system in
the absence of suspicious behavior. The court explained that it
knew of "no rule of law"8 6 requiring directors to put a monitoring
system in place designed to ferret out information regarding
illegal activity.
Under the Sarbanes Act, there now exists an identifiable
rule of law with such a requirement. As noted, the Act not only
requires executives to implement and maintain internal controls,
but also requires that the annual report give an account of the
status and viability of that system.8 7 Arguably, the current
climate of corporate managers' seemingly widespread
noncompliance with various corporate and securities laws may
put corporations on notice of possible violations. Allis-Chalmers
makes clear, however, that general allegations against other
corporate officials should not be sufficient to put corporations on
notice of possible violations within their own company. Absent
such notice, Allis-Chalmers does not appear to require the
implementation of monitoring procedures. Hence, the Sarbanes
Act may be viewed as an abrupt departure from existing law on
this subject.
The Guidelines suggest that managers' duty to remain
informed can be satisfied through the maintenance of monitoring
devices. The Guidelines allow sentencing courts to decrease the
amount of criminal fines they impose on corporations if such
entities have in place a program to prevent and detect violations
of the law.88 While the Guidelines do not serve as a source of
corporate fiduciary obligations, they can impact how corporate
83 Apparently, the company consented to the decrees in order to avoid the
expense of a proceeding and never admitted to price fixing. See id.
84 See id. at 129-30.
85 See id. at 130.
86 Id.
87 See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
88 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556; U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2001).
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managers comply with those obligations.8 9  Indeed, the
Guidelines create incentive for managers to meet their duty to
remain informed through implementation of adequate control
procedures.9 0
Also, the SEC has indicated that compliance procedures may
represent a necessary component of board members' duty to
remain informed. Indeed, after reporting on several directors'
lack of knowledge about important company events, the SEC
concluded that this lack of knowledge "demonstrate [d] the need
for adequate, regularized procedures under the overall
supervision of the Board to ensure that proper disclosures are
being made."91 Such procedures should be designed to ensure
that the board takes part in the disclosure process in a more
meaningful way by remaining informed about company
activities. 92 The SEC pointed out that even corporate directors
with considerable business experience cannot adequately
perform their duties when the corporation does not have an
internal monitoring system.9 3 In the SEC's view, such a system
allows corporate managers to appreciate the company's business
so that they may make informed judgments. 94 The SEC has a
strong preference for establishing monitoring procedures in
order to ensure corporate managers comply with their fiduciary
duty.
Moreover, the Delaware chancery court has affirmatively
maintained that directors satisfy their duty of information only
when effective control systems are in place. In re Caremark
International Inc.95 involved a motion for settlement of a
derivative action against corporate directors alleging breaches of
89 See In re Caremark Intl Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting the
importance of the Guidelines in the conduct of business corporations).
90 See id.
91 Report of Investigation in the Matter of National Telephone Co., supra note
68, at *4.
92 See id.
93 See Report of Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex Corp. Relating to
Activities of the Board of Directors of Stirling Homex Corp., Exchange Act Release
No. 34-11516, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80, 219, at
85,462-63 (July 16, 1975).
94 See id. at 85,462.
95 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). For a discussion of Caremark's application in
the context of racial discrimination suits, see Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination
and the Relationship Between the Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure,
63 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 403-10 (2002).
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the duty of care. In Caremark, Chancellor Allen, speaking for
the court, addressed in detail the manner in which directors
comply with their duty to remain informed. Chancellor Allen
pointed out that "relevant and timely information is an essential
predicate" for satisfaction of a board members' duty of care. 96
Interpreting Allis-Chalmers, Chancellor Allen argued that its
holding could not be generalized to stand for the notion that
corporate directors have no duty to maintain an information
gathering system absent suspicion of wrongdoing. 97 Chancellor
Allen insisted that, in light of the more exacting standards
required by the Delaware Supreme Court under Van Gorkom
and other more recent cases, the current court would not accept
such a formulation of Allis-Chalmers.98 Chancellor Allen found
that:
corporate boards [can not] satisfy their obligation to be
reasonably informed... without assuring themselves that
information and reporting systems exist in the organization
that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management
and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to
allow management and the board, each within its scope, to
reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation's
compliance with law and its business performance. 99
Chancellor Allen suggested that only when corporations
have these information systems in place can they establish good
faith and avoid liability for a breach of their fiduciary duty.100
The Sarbanes Act's requirement of an internal monitoring
system appears to codify the dictates of Caremark, as well as the
preferences of the SEC and the Guidelines. In that sense, it
appears to be a natural extension of corporate directors' and
officers' duty under Caremark to affirmatively acquire material
information relevant to the performance of their fiduciary
responsibility.
96 In re Caremark, 689 A.2d at 970.
97 See id. at 969. Instead, the court maintained that Allis-Chalmers can be
interpreted to mean that corporate directors cannot be held liable for assuming the
integrity of their employees without grounds to suspect deception. See id.
98 See id. at 969-70.
99 Id. at 970.
100 Chancellor Allen concluded that the existence of a corporate compliance
committee demonstrated the directors' "good faith attempt to be informed of
relevant facts." Id. at 971.
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2. Duty of Inquiry
The duty of inquiry is intricately related to corporate
managers' ability to rely on other officers or corporate reports.
The previous section suggested that while directors and officers
have the ability to rely in good faith on others, under some
circumstances, their duty of care may require more. In this way,
the duty to remain informed suggests some duty of inquiry, but
does not suggest when that duty may be triggered. This section
reveals that there are at least three circumstances under which
the duty of inquiry arises: (1) when corporate officials know of
possible wrongdoing; (2) when they have responsibility for
approving specific documents; and (3) during major corporate
transactions.
As early as 1920, the Supreme Court recognized that
corporate managers have a duty of inquiry at least when they
are put on notice about illegal or suspicious activity within their
company.1 1  Other more recent cases confirm this duty of
inquiry. 10 2 The formulation of the duty of inquiry rests on a "red
flag" conception, which maintains that directors cannot be held
liable for inaction unless they failed to act in the face of
significant and clear indications of corporate wrongdoing. Thus,
in Allis-Chalmers, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the
argument that directors' knowledge of illegal activities twenty
years earlier should have put them on notice of a duty to "ferret
out such activity and to take active steps to insure that it would
not be repeated."10 3 The court concluded that the directors had
no actual knowledge of current facts that should have put them
on guard and therefore did not have a responsibility to make
further inquiries of their agents. 04
Also, the SEC has noted that the duty to investigate upon
knowledge of red flags arises even when a company has an
internal monitoring system in place. In its investigation of W.R.
Grace & Co., the SEC found that certain of the company's
officers and directors had violated federal securities laws.105 The
l01 See Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524, 530-31 (1920).
102 See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)
("[D]irectors are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates
until something occurs to put them on suspicion that something is wrong.").
103 Id. at 129.
104 See id.
105 See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
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SEC issued a report emphasizing the affirmative responsibilities
of the corporate officers who had not been involved in securities
violations. 1 6 While those officers were aware of information
appearing to contradict company disclosure documents, 107 the
company had in place procedures designed to ensure that
material information would be properly disclosed. 08 Thus, the
officers did not make inquiries regarding the reasons for
contradictory information because they assumed that company
procedures and the agents responsible for those procedures had
considered such information in making their disclosure. 0 9 The
SEC maintained that the officers were not at liberty to make
such an assumption. Instead, they had a responsibility to "go
beyond the established procedures" and question the absence of
disclosure because they were on notice that the internal
procedures may be defective. 110 Thus, they had no reasonable
basis for reliance on the procedures."' In this way, the SEC has
suggested that corporate officers have a duty of inquiry even
when corporations implement monitoring systems.
The duty of inquiry also appears to be triggered when
executive officers and directors approve particular documents.
Certainly the SEC's pronouncements in W.R. Grace reflect its
understanding that corporate officers and directors'
responsibility for approving company periodic reports requires
them to make inquiries about the content of those reports. 112
More specifically, the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the
"Securities Act"), makes directors and officers responsible for
reasonably investigating the information within a company's
registration statement. 113 Directors and officers who sign a
Exchange Act of 1934 Concerning the Conduct of Certain Former Officers and
Directors of W.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-39157, [1997 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 85,963, at 89,893 (Sept. 30, 1997).
106 See id. at 89,893-94.
107 See id. at 89,894.
108 See id. at 89,893.
109 See id. at 89,897.
110 Id. at 89,894.
111 See id. at 89,897.
112 See id. at 89,894 (noting the duty to be vigilant in the disclosure process).
113 Section 11 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, imposes civil
liability on the chief executive officer, chief financial officer and every board member
for any material misstatement or omission contained with an effective registration
statement. These officers and directors can avoid liability with respect to non-
expertised portions (which excludes financial statements of the registration
statement) if, after reasonable investigation, they had reasonable ground to believe
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defective registration may avoid liability only if they have
satisfied their due diligence defense. 114 This means that officers
and directors must investigate the adequacy of the information
in the registration statement. 115 In fact, officers cannot avoid
liability by relying on accountants or other experts to perform
investigations for them.116 This is true even when an officer has
a limited role in a company or does not have the financial
background necessary to understand financial matters. 117 Then
too, officers must ask questions aimed at eliciting information
specific to the disclosures being made; general inquiries will not
suffice. 118 In this way, the Securities Act imposes a duty of
investigation on directors and officers in connection with their
approval of the registration statement.
A duty of inquiry also appears to arise in the context of a
director or officer's responsibility to make major decisions. Like
the duty accompanying the signer's responsibility under the
Securities Act, the duty of inquiry with respect to transactions
also may be triggered even when directors and officers do not
and did believe that the statements were true and not misleading. See § 77(k)(b)(3).
With regard to expertised portions such as the financial statements, such managers
must prove that they had a reasonable ground to believe and did not believe that
the statements were untrue or misleading. See id.
114 See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-92 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (holding that several directors and executives failed to establish a due
diligence defense).
115 See id.
116 See id. at 685-86. With respect to the treasurer and CEO, the court found
that he could not rely on information provided by the independent accountants. See
id. at 685 (noting that officer, who had some knowledge of relevant facts "could not
shut his eyes to the facts and rely on Peat, Marwick"). The court held that the
controller did not establish his due diligence defense because he assumed that
others would check financial data. See id. at 686 (noting that as a signer, the
controller "could not avoid responsibility by leaving it up to others to make it
accurate"). The court also found that a person who served as a secretary and
director could not rely on others to get it right even when he had no personal
knowledge of the company's accounts. Instead, he had to make an investigation
regarding those facts. See id. at 687.
117 See id. at 653, 684 (noting the limited educational background of certain
officers who did not have a high school education and hence may have difficulty
reviewing the registration statement); id. at 684 (noting that certain officers only
supervised limited activities within the company); id. at 688 (noting that an
individual who served as secretary and director' did not have experience, but
nevertheless could be held liable).
118 See id. at 688 (noting that while the outside director had made general
inquiries about the company, he did not ask questions regarding the information
within the prospectus and therefore did not satisfy his duty of investigation).
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have actual knowledge of improprieties. In Van Gorkom, the
Delaware court suggested that directors were "duty bound to
make reasonable inquiry" of corporate executives given the
magnitude of the decision before them and the absence of
information related to that decision. 119 In that case, there were
no "red flags," but the court focused on the fact that directors
had a duty to inform themselves regarding the specifics of the
transaction, and that no one raised questions or sought
information regarding the financial aspect of the transaction.120
Under those circumstances, the directors' responsibility to
properly approve the conditions of a merger triggered a duty to
ask relevant questions about those conditions, particularly when
they were not presented with sufficient information to assess all
aspects of the merger. Similarly, directors are responsible for
approving conflict of interest transactions. The fact that this
function rests solely on their shoulders appears to trigger a duty
of inquiry. The SEC has explained that under such
circumstances, "the board should not rely solely on information
from interested management but should also seek information
from independent non-interested sources when available." 121
Thus, when directors and officers are entrusted with the
responsibility of approving specific kinds of transactions, their
duty of care includes the duty to ask appropriate questions.
These cases again suggest that the conduct of the directors
and officers reflected in the congressional testimony violated
their duty of inquiry. Indeed, such managers appeared to rely
completely on internal procedures, even though they had
concerns about the sufficiency of those procedures. The SEC's
release suggests that these managers had a responsibility to
probe more deeply. More importantly, because these managers
bore responsibility for approving conflict of interest transactions,
they had a duty to ask detailed and critical questions of the
officers involved with such transactions. Their failure to do so
violated the duty of inquiry articulated by the SEC and the
Delaware Supreme Court in Van Gorkom.
This exacting duty of inquiry is reflected in the Sarbanes
119 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875 (Del. 1985).
120 See id. at 877.
121 Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Regarding the Investigation of Gould Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-13612
(June 9, 1977), available at 1977 WL 175761.
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Act. To the extent corporate managers have knowledge that
suggests problems with the quality of the information they have
received, there appears to be an implicit obligation to make
further inquiries. This may be explicit in the case of board
members who have the responsibility for ensuring that
complaints about accounting information is made known to
them. In this same view, because officers must analyze the
sufficiency of their internal monitoring procedures, they appear
to have a duty much like those in W.R. Grace to go beyond those
structures and obtain some independent verification of the
structures validity. Hence, the implied duty of inquiry within
the Sarbanes Act seems to be in line with SEC releases and
other case law in this area.
CONCLUSIONS AND PROBABLE IMPACT OF SARBANES ACT
The fact that the Sarbanes Act appears to confirm recent
articulations of corporate managers' fiduciary responsibility has
both positive and negative repercussions. On the one hand,
these parallels should serve to reassure corporate managers
because they suggest the pre-existence of roadmaps for meeting
the obligations under the Sarbanes Act. Indeed, courts and the
SEC indicate that if such directors maintain an adequate
monitoring system and remain informed about the adequacy of
that system, their behavior will be protected under the business
judgment rule and the securities laws. The Sarbanes Act, by
outlining the manner in which control mechanisms should be
developed, serves to highlight how corporate managers can
satisfy their obligations. Aside from such monitoring systems,
corporate officers and directors, guided by case law, have
established a process designed to satisfy their due diligence
defense in connection with registration statements. This
process, which involves both remaining informed about material
information and asking appropriate questions, can be
implemented more broadly for filings of all public documents,
and should serve to shield directors and officers from liability.
Hence, because the obligations under the Sarbanes Act bear
similarity to those required under the securities law and other
corporate doctrine, corporate directors and officers already have
guidance regarding the manner in which they can meet those
obligations.
The Sarbanes Act also represents a positive development
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because it validates trends that impose more stringent
obligations on corporate managers. The fact that widespread
conduct in violation of these trends occurred suggests that many
corporate directors and officers felt free to ignore the more
exacting obligations. Certainly there is a healthy body of
corporate law appearing to condone less exacting standards of
conduct. The Sarbanes Act may be just the impetus corporate
law needs to undermine those presumptions.
On the other hand, if one views the Sarbanes Act as merely
mimicking existing law, there may be cause for skepticism about
its ability to alter corporate officials' conduct. Indeed, if
pronouncements by courts, the SEC, and even the Sentencing
Commission, failed to force directors and officers to pay greater
attention to their responsibilities, there may be no reason to
believe that the Sarbanes Act will generate greater compliance.
Despite its similarity with some existing strands of fiduciary
law, the Sarbanes Act includes provisions that may serve to
deter more effectively violations of those duties. Indeed, the Act
contains criminal and other provisions that may serve to deter
violations of fiduciary duty by increasing the potential that
directors and officers will face liability for such violations.122
Also, the public attention to the inadequacies of corporate
behavior may compel many officers and directors to pay greater
attention to their own responsibilities. As a consequence, the
Sarbanes Act may be a welcome response to the current systems'
inability to enforce adequately the fiduciary duties of corporate
officers and directors. In this way, the Sarbanes Act should be
viewed as a positive development because it may ensure that
managers will take more seriously the duty they owe to the
corporate enterprise.
122 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906, 116 Stat. 745,
806 (to be codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1350) (imposing $1 million fine, 10
years in jail, or both for persons who knowingly violate the certification requirement
and a $5 million fine, 20 years in jail, or both for willful violations of that provision).
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